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11.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the fraction of nonelderly adults in the
United States receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (hereafter DI)
benefits increased by 76 percent, with 6.20 million disabled workers on the
program in December of 2004.1 Recent work has suggested that the growth
during this period was to some extent driven by an increase in the financial
incentive to apply for DI and by a liberalization of the program’s medical el-
igibility criteria (Autor and Duggan 2003). These changes alone, however,
were not the only ones influencing the increase in DI receipt. In this chap-
ter, we estimate the contribution of several factors to the growth in the DI
rolls during the past two decades. We divide our determinants into three dis-
tinct categories—the characteristics of individuals insured by the DI pro-
gram, the state of the economy, and the generosity of program benefits.
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1. This does not include an additional 2.7 million nonelderly adults who received disability
benefits from the means-tested Supplemental Security Income program but not from DI. Nor
does it include the 1.60 million children of disabled workers receiving benefits or the 0.15 mil-
lion spouses. It does include the 1.3 million nonelderly adults who received disability benefits
from both DI and SSI.
We begin with an examination of the changing age structure in the
United States (section 11.2). These changes could be important given that
DI receipt is so strongly related to age. For example, the probability that a
fifty to sixty-four-year-old man receives DI benefits is more than five times
greater than the same probability for his counterpart between the ages of
twenty and forty-nine. With individuals from the Baby Boom generation
now between the ages of forty and fifty-eight (versus twenty and thirty-
eight two decades ago), one would expect a large increase in DI receipt. Ac-
cording to our results, the changing age structure of the nonelderly adult
population in the United States can explain 15 percent of the increase in
DI receipt among men, but just 4 percent for women. This disparity is
partly because the growth in DI receipt has been almost twice as large for
women as for men during the past two decades, and thus there is less to ex-
plain for the latter group.
One explanation for the diﬀerential increase in DI receipt among women
is the growth in the fraction of women insured by DI. Given that an indi-
vidual must have twenty quarters of work history during the past ten years
to be insured for DI benefits, the substantial increases in female labor force
participation in recent decades have increased the fraction of women in-
sured by the program. Our findings suggest that this eﬀect is substantial, as
it can explain 24 percent of the growth in DI receipt among women, but
just 3 percent among men.
We next turn to the contribution of changes in the health status of
nonelderly adults to the growth in DI receipt (section 11.3). On the most
widely used measure—mortality—nonelderly adults have become signifi-
cantly healthier over time. For example, the probability that a male born in
1921 survived to the age of sixty was just 68 percent, whereas a male born
twenty years later had a 78 percent chance of surviving to this age. The re-
ductions in mortality were similarly large among women. But this fall in
mortality could have a perverse eﬀect on the health of individuals who are
alive because marginal survivors may be in poor health. Using data from
the National Health Interview Survey covering the years 1984–2001, our
findings suggest that near-elderly adults are on average getting healthier
whereas health among younger adults has remained roughly constant.
Though the measures of health in the NHIS are far from perfect, our find-
ings suggest that changes in health reduced the growth of DI receipt below
what it otherwise would have been.
Recent studies have suggested that economic conditions have an im-
portant eﬀect on the fraction of individuals receiving DI benefits (Black,
Daniel, and Sanders 2002; Autor and Duggan 2003). An examination of the
change in DI application rates during the two most recent recessions sup-
ports this hypothesis. For example, from 1989 to 1993 the number of appli-
cations to DI increased by 45 percent and from 1999 to 2003 by an even
larger 58 percent. It is therefore plausible that adverse economic shocks in-
crease the number of individuals applying for and ultimately awarded ben-
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efits. Our findings in section 11.4 suggest that the recessions of 1991 and
2001 can explain 24 percent of the growth in DI receipt among men and 12
percent of the growth among women.
Another line of research has emphasized the importance of DI benefit
generosity as a determinant of DI application propensities (Parsons, 1980;
Bound, 1989; Gruber, 2000). Though the formula used by the Social Secu-
rity Administration (SSA) to calculate individuals’ DI benefits did not
change during our study period, individuals’ incentives to apply for DI has
changed, as shown in section 11.5. Because of the interaction between ris-
ing income inequality and the progressive benefit formula used by SSA,
low-skilled individuals can now replace a much larger fraction of their
earnings with DI benefits than they could have two decades ago. Our find-
ings suggest that rising replacement rates can explain 28 percent of the
growth in DI receipt among women and 24 percent of the growth for men.
In section 11.6, the last factor that we consider turns out to be the most
important. Because of federal legislation enacted in 1984, the Social Se-
curity Administration was required to use a more liberal definition of dis-
ability when deciding whether to accept or reject a DI application. For
example, the SSA had to use less strict criteria for mental disorders and
place greater weight on pain—a condition that might be diﬃcult to verify.
These changes diﬀerentially increased the probability that individuals
with mental disorders or musculoskeletal conditions (e.g., back pain,
arthritis) were awarded DI benefits, with the fraction of DI awards to these
two conditions increasing from 28 percent in 1983 to 52 percent twenty
years later. Our findings suggest that the liberalized eligibility criteria can
explain 38 percent of the growth in DI receipt among women and 53 per-
cent for men.
We conclude the chapter (section 11.7) with a forecast of the changes in
disability recipiency that will occur during the upcoming years. For at least
four reasons, it is likely that the growth in the DI rolls will continue and per-
haps accelerate. First, given the average number of awards at present and
the average duration of individuals awarded benefits, it is clear that the pro-
gram is far below its equilibrium size. To reach this equilibrium, the num-
ber of recipients would need to increase by 62 percent (to more than 9.8
million). Second, as the Baby Boom generation reaches its sixties, the im-
portance of the age structure eﬀect mentioned previously will increase sub-
stantially, with more individuals in these peak disability years. Third, be-
cause of reductions in the generosity of Social Security retirement benefits
but no corresponding reduction for DI, the program will become relatively
more attractive and thus more individuals are likely to apply. And finally,
the rising cost of health insurance and the increase in the number who are
uninsured suggests that the demand for the Medicare coverage resulting
from DI receipt will increase. For all of these reasons, it is likely that the DI
rolls will grow substantially above their current level in the absence of any
changes to the program.
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11.2 Previous Research
A substantial body of previous research has examined the causes and the
consequences of the growth in the disability rolls. The vast majority of these
works have focused attention on the eﬀect of DI on the labor force partici-
pation (LFP) of men. For example Parsons (1980, 1984) argued that virtu-
ally all of the fall in male labor force participation during the post-World
War II era was caused by the growing generosity of the DI program. How-
ever, Haveman and Wolfe (1984) argued that Parsons’ model is incorrectly
specified and when they redid his analysis, they found little contribution to
the drop in male (LFP) from DI. In addition, Bound (1989) later challenged
Parsons’ estimates after finding that more than one-half of rejected DI ap-
plicants in a sample of awardees from the 1970s remained out of the labor
force even after their rejections. This study did not claim that DI had no
eﬀect on labor market outcomes, but instead that the relationship between
DI receipt and labor force exit was much less than one-for-one.
Subsequent studies supported the hypothesis that changes in the gen-
erosity of DI benefits and in the medical eligibility criteria influenced labor
force participation, with the magnitude varying to some extent across stud-
ies and virtually all of these studies focusing exclusively on men (Parsons
1991a, 1991b; Bound 1991; Bound and Waidmann 1992; Gruber and Ku-
bik 1997; Stapleton et al. 1998; Kreider 1999; Bound and Waidmann 2002).
These studies had the limitation that because DI is a federal program, there
was no obvious control group that could be used to disentangle the eﬀect
of changes in DI from other factors. To surmount this obstacle, Gruber
(2000) used a substantial change in disability benefits in the Canadian
province of Quebec to estimate the eﬀect of DI benefit generosity. In this
study, the author uses the other Canadian provinces as a control group and
finds that the elasticity of labor force exit to DI benefit generosity is ap-
proximately 0.3.
One recent study has emphasized the role of changes in the financial in-
centive to apply for DI resulting from the interaction of the growth in in-
come inequality and the progressive formula used to determine DI benefits
(Autor and Duggan 2003). The authors argue that rising replacement rates
(the fraction of one’s income that can be replaced with DI benefits) and the
more liberal definition of disability used following federal legislation en-
acted in 1984 increased the likelihood that low-skilled individuals would
exit the labor force to apply for DI. The authors stress that both of these
factors increased the sensitivity of DI recipiency to economic conditions.
Other studies have examined the contribution of business cycle eﬀects to
the growth in DI receipt. For example, Rupp and Stapleton (1995) sum-
marize a series of early papers on the eﬀect of the unemployment rate on
DI receipt which find that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate is associated with up to a 7 percent increase in DI awards (Lewin-
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VHI 1995; Stapleton, Coleman, and Dietrich 1995; Hambor 1992, 1975;
Levy and Krute 1983; Muller 1982; Lando 1979). A more recent analysis
by Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002) uses plausibly exogenous shocks to
the coal mining industry to estimate the eﬀect of economic conditions on
DI receipt. Their findings, though not strictly comparable to the studies de-
scribed in Rupp and Stapleton, suggest an elasticity of DI payments with
respect to local earnings of 0.4.
Changing health and population dynamics have also been suggested as
possible explanations for the DI increase. Indeed, the aging of the Baby
Boom generation has become an important issue for the DI program, since
adults who are near retirement age are more likely to apply for and enroll
in DI than others. Stapleton et al. (1998) suggest that population growth
and aging accounted for a 1.3 percent annual DI growth rate from 1988 to
1992. However, the eﬀects of aging may have been tempered by improve-
ments in health. In particular, improvements in cardiovascular mortality
have been dramatic. Cutler and Meara (2001) suggest that 98 percent of
mortality reductions since 1960 have been from changes in cardiovascular
mortality. Other evidence has shown that overall health amongst non-
elderly adults has been improving (Cutler and Richardson 1997).
Whether the prevalence of disabilities has increased or fallen has been an
issue of much debate. Crimmins, Saito, and Ingegneri (1989) find that al-
though prevalence of long-term disability has increased, improvements in
life expectancy and health care have caused disability-free life expectancy
to increase as well. Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman (2004) find
disability prevalence to be increasing amongst thirty to fifty-nine-year-
olds and remaining stable amongst sixty to sixty-nine-year-olds. Consid-
ering that over the time period of their analysis, 1984–1996, all of the Baby
Boom generation fell into the thirty to fifty-nine age at some point, the im-
plications of rising disability in this age group for the DI program are enor-
mous. One important limitation to both of these studies is that their mea-
sures of health status are based on self-reports and thus may not accurately
capture true changes in morbidity over time.2
Taken together, past studies suggest that three sets of changes—in 
the characteristics of individuals insured by DI, in economic conditions,
and in the financial incentive to apply for DI—have played an important
role in the growth of DI receipt from 1984 to the present. In this study, we
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2. There are at least three reasons that self-reporting of disabilities can create biased preva-
lence estimates. First, increased awareness of conditions could aﬀect people’s responses to
questions about activity-limiting conditions. For example, it is possible that additional expo-
sure to information about treatments for conditions may make people more aware of whether
they are aﬀected by them. Second, the responses to questions on activity limitations are de-
pendent on people’s choices regarding which activities they perform and their employment
(Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman 2004). Finally, there is the possibility that for some
people, whether they say they are work-limited or activity-limited may be causally determined
by whether they receive disability benefits.
estimate the contribution of each one of these factors while also forecast-
ing the likely changes in the disability rolls in the years ahead.
11.3 The Impact of Changes in the Age Structure, 
DI Insured Status, and Health
From December of 1984 to December of 2004, the number of individu-
als receiving disabled worker benefits from the federal Disability Insurance
program increased by 139 percent (from 2.60 million to 6.20 million). Part
of this increase was attributable to population growth, with the number of
nonelderly adults rising by 29 percent during that same period. But this
leaves a substantial portion of the growth unexplained, as evidenced by the
increase from 1.91 percent to 3.38 percent in the fraction of twenty to sixty-
four-year-old adults on DI during the same period (fig. 11.1). In this sec-
tion, we explore the contribution of changes in the age distribution, in the
fraction of nonelderly adults insured by DI, and in the health of the adult
population to the growth in the disability rolls during the past two decades.
11.3.1 Changes in the Age Distribution
Each year, the Social Security Administration publishes data on the
number of DI recipients by gender and age category. Combining this in-
formation with population data from the Census Bureau, one can investi-
gate how DI receipt varies by gender and age in each year. The first column
of table 11.1 provides DI recipiency rates for men and women, respectively,
in 1984. As is clear from both panels, the probability that an individual
342 Mark Duggan and Scott A. Imberman
Fig. 11.1 Fraction of population aged 20–64 on DI: 1978–2003
Sources: SSA Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary; U.S. Census Bureau.
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received DI benefits two decades ago was a steeply increasing function of
his or her age. For example, a male in his early sixties was 10.8 times more
likely than a male in his thirties to receive DI benefits. This ratio was even
larger for women at 11.3. This positive relationship between age and DI re-
ceipt is perhaps not surprising given that measures of health such as the
probability of survival from one year to the next, likelihood of not having
an activity-limiting disability, and self-reported health decline with age
(Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman 2004; Case and Deaton 2003;
Cutler and Meara 2001).
The first column in this two table also demonstrates the substantial diﬀer-
ence between men and women in the probability of DI receipt, with women
in each of the six age categories listed less than half as likely as their male
counterparts to receive disability benefits. For example, while nearly 12 per-
cent of men in their early sixties were receiving DI benefits in this base year,
just 5.3 percent of women in this same age group were on the program.
The third column of this table lists the U.S. population by age group in
1984.3 The number of individuals in their twenties and thirties in 1984 was
substantially greater than the number in either their forties or their fifties
for both men and women and accounted for more than 57 percent of all
adults aged twenty to sixty-four. This diﬀerence was largely driven by the
surge in birth rates that occurred in the years following World War II. Al-
most all of the Baby Boom generation—defined by the U.S. Census Bureau
as individuals born between 1946 and 1964—were between the ages of
twenty and thirty-nine in 1984.
As previously noted and shown in the first column of table 11.1, DI re-
cipiency rates in 1984 were especially low among young adults. Just 0.4
percent of men in their twenties and 1.1 percent of men in their thirties
were receiving DI benefits two decades ago. Because of the positive rela-
tionship between DI receipt and age, one would have expected the DI rolls
to grow as these individuals reached their forties and fifties. And as the next
two columns of the table show, the aging of the Baby Boom generation was
associated with a substantial change in age structure, with the fraction of
both men and women in their forties and fifties increasing from 35 percent
to 46 percent from 1984 to 2003.
In the next three columns we investigate how much of the growth in DI
receipt can be explained by the change in population in each age-gender
cell from 1984 to 2003. To do this, we take the product of the cell-specific
DI recipiency rate in 1984, and the population in that same cell in 2003,
and then sum up these predictions across the twelve age-gender groups as
specified in the following equation:
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3. Only individuals between the ages of twenty and sixty-four are listed here given that DI
recipients switch to Social Security retirement benefits when they reach sixty-five and because
very few people under the age of twenty have suﬃcient work history to be eligible for DI.
DISim  ∑
6
a1
(af,1984  Naf,2003)  ∑
6
a1
(am,1984  Nam,2003)
with am,1984 and af,1984 equaling the fraction of men and women, respec-
tively, in age group a who were receiving DI benefits in 1984. The popula-
tion in each of the six age cells in 2003 is equal to Naf,2003 for women and
Nam,2003 for men. Using this algorithm, we estimate that the number of men
receiving DI would have increased from 1.75 million to 2.43 million from
1984 to 2003 if the rate of DI receipt within each age group had remained
the same. The actual number receiving DI in 2003 was 3.22 million, and
thus this projection explains 46 percent of the increase in the number of
men receiving DI since 1984.
But much of this projection simply captures the fact that the number of
men between the ages of twenty and sixty-four is increasing during this pe-
riod. If one instead only asks how much of the increase in the proportion
of men receiving DI can be explained by changes in the age structure, this
prediction can explain much less of the increase. Given the changes in age
structure from 1984 to 2003, the algorithm described above predicts an in-
crease from 2.64 percent to 2.81 percent in the fraction of men receiving
DI. Given the true increase to 3.72 percent, this factor can explain just 15.5
percent of the growth in the likelihood that a nonelderly adult male re-
ceives DI benefits.
Among women the contribution of changes in the age structure to the
growth in DI receipt has been even smaller, with just 3.6 percent of the in-
crease in DI recipiency rates explained by this factor. This is primarily be-
cause the growth has been much more rapid among women than men dur-
ing this period, with the number of women receiving DI increasing by 212
percent from 1984 to 2003, while the corresponding increase for men was
just 84 percent. While it is true that women started from a much lower rate
of DI receipt in 1984, this diﬀerence remains even if one compares the in-
crease in the fraction of women receiving DI, which grew by 1.81 percent-
age points versus just 1.08 percentage points for men. One possible reason
for the diﬀerence is the greater increase among women in the likelihood of
being insured by DI, which was itself caused by the rise in female labor
force participation. We examine this in the next section.
11.3.2 Changes in DI Eligibility
In order to be insured for DI benefits, an individual between the ages of
thirty and sixty-four must have worked in at least five of the ten years before
the onset of his or her disability.4 This standard is relaxed for younger indi-
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4. More specifically, a person must have at least 20 quarters of coverage during the preced-
ing ten years. The amount of earnings needed to receive 1 quarter of coverage increases from
one year to the next. For example, in 1984 a person who earned more than $1,560 during the
year would have received credit for 4 quarters, while by 2003 the amount needed had in-
creased to $3,480.
viduals, who must instead have worked in at least half of the years since the
age of twenty-one. Part of the reason that men were two times more likely
than women to receive DI in 1984 was that they were much more likely to
have suﬃcient work history to be insured. For example, 86 percent of males
in their fifties were eligible to receive DI benefits if they developed a disabil-
ity in 1984, compared to just 53 percent of females in this same age group.
During the subsequent two decades, there was a steady convergence be-
tween the fraction of men and women insured by DI as a result of the in-
crease in female labor force participation during this period. This trend is
illustrated in figure 11.2, which shows that from 1984 to 2003 eligibility
amongst women twenty to sixty-four rose from 62.8 percent to 75.2 percent.
In comparison, male eligibility fell slightly from 89.9 percent to 86.2 per-
cent. Given this trend, it is perhaps not surprising that the growth in DI re-
ceipt was substantially greater for women than for men during this period.
In table 11.2 we investigate the contribution of the growth in DI insured
status for both men and women to the increase in DI receipt from 1984 to
2003. Our method here is similar to the one used in the preceding section.
Specifically, we estimate the change in DI receipt that would have occurred
from 1984 to 2003 if the fraction of insured individuals in each age cell ac-
tually receiving DI benefits remained at its 1984 level.
The first two columns of table 11.2 reveal that the diﬀerence between
men and women in DI receipt in our base year of 1984 was much smaller 
if one denominated by the number insured by DI rather than by the total
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Fig. 11.2 Percent of population DI insured
Sources: SSA Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary; U.S. Census Bureau; Annual Statistical Supple-
ment of the Social Security Bulletin.
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population in the age cell. For example, men between the ages of fifty-five
and fifty-nine were 2.19 times more likely than women in this same age
group to be receiving DI benefits. But this male-female ratio fell to just 1.36
among individuals insured by the program.
The next several columns summarize the change in insurance rates by
age and gender from 1984 to 2003. Among men there was very little change
in the fraction of individuals eligible for DI during this period, with the
patterns diﬀering to some extent across age groups. For example, the frac-
tion of men in their thirties insured by DI fell from 94 percent to 86 percent
during this nineteen-year period, while the corresponding shares for men
in their fifties increased from 84 percent to 90 percent.5 Given these oﬀset-
ting changes, it is not surprising that the change in the fraction of men in-
sured by DI accounted for just 3.1 percent of their total increase in DI re-
ceipt during our nineteen-year study period.
For women these changes were much more important. As shown in table
11.2, the fraction of women eligible for DI increased in all age groups dur-
ing our study period. The increase was especially large for older women.
For example, in 1984 less than 54 percent of women in their fifties were el-
igible for DI, whereas in 2003 this share had increased to 76 percent. Sum-
ming up the predicted increases across the diﬀerent age groups and sub-
tracting out the portion attributable to changes in the age structure, our
findings suggest that 24 percent of the increase in the fraction of women on
DI can be explained by the growth in their insured status.
11.3.3 Changes in Health Status
In order to qualify for DI, a person must have a medically determinable
ailment that is expected to last for at least twelve months or result in death
and that prevents him or her from engaging in substantial gainful activity.
To the extent that the health of DI-insured individuals has changed over
time, this would influence program enrollment even if all other factors re-
mained constant. In this section, we explore the contribution of changes in
health status to the rise in the disability rolls during the past two decades.
As previous researchers have noted, there is no perfect way to capture
changes in health over time. A commonly used measure is mortality,
though this has the obvious limitation that it does not capture the inci-
dence of nonlethal but debilitating conditions. Despite this, it has a clear
advantage because it is consistently defined over time.
According to this measure, the health of nonelderly adults has improved
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5. The one outlier group is twenty to twenty-nine-year-olds, whose fraction insured fell sub-
stantially from 91 percent to 78 percent. Some of this change is likely due to the considerable
increase in college attendance amongst males over this time period (U.S. Department of Ed-
ucation). Since very few people in this age group received DI in 1984, this fall in the fraction
of twenty to twenty-nine-year-olds insured likely had only a negligible eﬀect on the total num-
ber of DI beneficiaries.
dramatically during the past two decades.6 The data summarized in table
11.3 list annual mortality rates for both men and women between the ages
of fifty and sixty-four in 1981, 1991, and 2001. During the twenty years
from 1981 to 2001, annual mortality rates for men and women fell by 34
percent and 22 percent, respectively. Both changes were driven by a sub-
stantial decline in the death rate from circulatory disease, which fell by 51
percent for near-elderly males and by 43 percent for females, and ac-
counted for 70 percent and 69 percent of the total drop in mortality rates
for men and women, respectively.
As figure 11.3 demonstrates, these reductions in mortality were not lim-
ited to the fifty to sixty-four year age group. In this figure, we plot annual
mortality rates by age for men and women born in 1921 and 1941. Across
the age distribution, mortality has been declining. For example, a forty-
year-old male born in 1941 was 20 percent less likely than his counterpart
born in 1921 to die during the year, while the corresponding decline for a
fifty-year-old male was 35 percent. As a result of these changes, individuals
have become more likely to survive to a certain age over time. Just 68 per-
cent of males born in 1921 survived to the age of sixty, while 78 percent of
their counterparts born in 1941 did (fig. 11.4).7 These improvements were
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6. See Cutler and Meara (2001) for a detailed analysis of changes in mortality throughout
the twentieth century across all age groups.
7. At the time the life tables used in this graph were created (1998), values for ages fifty-nine
to sixty-five for the 1941 cohort were projections rather than estimates.
Table 11.3 Leading causes of death for people aged 50–64, deaths per 
100,000 persons
Change % change
1981 1991 2001 1981–2001 1981–2002
A. Male Circulatory 681.5 470.9 333.8 –347.7 –51
Cancer 424.3 404.1 313.3 –111.0 –26
Respiratory 77.1 69.3 54.9 –22.2 –29
Diabetes 21.8 27.8 34.5 12.8 59
Suicide 24.3 24.3 22.1 –2.2 –9
Other 249.7 212.6 221.8 –27.9 –11
Total 1478.7 1209.0 980.5 –498.2 –34
B. Female Circulatory 273.3 204.4 156.3 –116.9 –43
Cancer 311.0 242.7 252.2 –58.8 –19
Respiratory 39.1 48.6 44.9 5.8 15
Diabetes 20.3 25.3 25.8 5.5 27
Suicide 9.5 6.5 6.4 –3.1 –32
Other 128.7 107.2 127.4 –1.3 –1
Total 781.8 698.8 613.0 –168.8 –22
Source: Authors’ calculations from NCHS Multiple Cause of Death Files and the Decennial
Census 1980–2000. Figures do not include U.S. territories, commonwealths, or other outly-
ing areas.
similarly dramatic for women, with survival rates to this age increasing from
78 percent for the 1921 cohort to 86 percent for women born in 1941.
Thus according to this measure, health among nonelderly adults has im-
proved dramatically in recent years. But these declines in mortality could
actually have produced a perverse eﬀect on average health by changing the
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Fig. 11.4 Survival of birth and gender cohorts
Source: SSA Life Tables via Berkeley Mortality Database, 1998.
Fig. 11.3 Age-specific mortality by year of birth and gender cohort
Source: SSA Life Tables via Berkeley Mortality Database, 1998.
composition of the nonelderly adult population. Put simply, those individ-
uals surviving to a certain age from the 1941 cohort who would not have
survived if born in the 1921 cohort may be less healthy than the average
nonelderly adult. Similarly, other factors could have led to changes in
health among the nonelderly adult population. For example, the well-
documented rise in obesity may have been associated with declines in cer-
tain measures of health (Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman 2004).
We therefore turn to an alternative measure—self-reported activity lim-
iting conditions (ALCs)—to estimate changes in health among the non-
elderly adult population since 1984. To do this, we utilize data from the an-
nual National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), which includes several
questions on activity-limiting conditions. Before describing the results, we
must address the benefits and drawbacks of using this data source. The
main advantage of using questions about ALCs from the NHIS is that they
have been asked in a consistent manner over a long period of time from
1984 to 1996. After the 1996 survey there were major changes in the survey
design of the NHIS that altered how some of the limitation questions were
asked and how information was recorded.8 Nonetheless, the questions
have remained largely unchanged since then. Thus, we consider these two
time periods separately. Despite this consistency in the wording of ALC
questions in the NHIS, researchers have raised questions concerning their
validity—and the validity of self-reported ALC questions in general—in
analyzing condition prevalence and the ability to work (Lakdawalla, Bhat-
tacharya, and Goldman 2004; Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Wittenburg
2003). Thus, even though these are some of the best measures of health sta-
tus that are publicly available, we must interpret trends in them with some
caution.
In table 11.4 panel a, we summarize changes from 1984 to 1996 in four
diﬀerent measures for males and females in three diﬀerent age groups
(thirty to thirty-nine, forty to forty-nine, and fifty to sixty-four). The first
column of this table summarizes changes for men and women between the
ages of fifty and sixty-four. In all eight cases, the changes from 1984 to 1996
suggest improvements in health for this age group (though just five of the
changes are statistically significant at the 10 percent level). For example,
the fraction of near-elderly men reporting a work limitation falls from 21.2
percent to 19.6 percent, with a similar decline for women from 21.3 percent
to 19.7 percent.
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8. For example, in the 1984–1996 NHIS, persons were asked whether they were limited in
their ability to conduct their major activity and then asked whether they were limited in their
ability to conduct any activity. In the 1997–2002 NHIS, people were asked separately whether
problems with cognitive functions aﬀect their ability to conduct activities and if any mental,
physical, or emotional problem created limitations. The changed working of these questions
could have motivated diﬀerent responses. Similar changes were made in other questions 
as well.
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The patterns are quite diﬀerent for individuals in their forties. For this
group, men are significantly more likely to report a work limitation and to
report that they are unable to work. For women, reporting of such limita-
tions increase, but not significantly. Work limitations and the complete in-
ability to work seem to have fallen for people in their thirties regardless of
gender, with the exception of work limitations for men. If these self-
reported measures are accurately capturing true changes in health, this
suggests that health is improving for near-elderly adults while it is declin-
ing for younger adults.
In panel b of table 11.4, we summarize data from the 1997 to 2002 NHIS
to measure the corresponding changes during this six-year period. In con-
trast to the changes from 1984 to 1996, the changes from 1997 to 2002 are
consistent across the age distribution and suggest that health has been im-
proving. For example, individuals in all six age-gender groups are less likely
to report a work limitation and more likely to report that they have neither
a work limitation nor an activity limitation. Because of the short time
frame analyzed here, however, we must be especially cautious about draw-
ing conclusions regarding trends in ALC prevalence.
Nonetheless, the analyses of both periods show that self-reported ALC
prevalence has fallen for the near-elderly, suggesting that health among
the near-elderly has improved substantially during the past two decades.
The evidence for younger adults is somewhat more mixed, with the net
change from 1984 to 2002 suggesting little change during this eighteen-
year period. But given that approximately 62 percent of DI recipients are
between the ages of fifty and sixty-four, changes for this age group will
contribute more to the change in DI receipt. It therefore appears that
changes in health during the past two decades have slowed rather than
added to the growth of the DI rolls. Absent these improvements, the
growth in DI enrollment from 1984 to the present would probably have
been even greater.
11.4 Economic Conditions
An alternative factor that could influence the number of individuals ap-
plying for and ultimately being awarded DI benefits is the business cycle.
As economic conditions decline, the value of searching for a new job or
continuing in one’s current job declines. Theoretically, one would expect
this eﬀect to induce some individuals to leave the labor force and apply for
DI benefits.9 Recent research has documented the importance of these
business cycle eﬀects, with DI application, award, and enrollment rates in-
creasing substantially in response to adverse economic shocks (Rupp and
354 Mark Duggan and Scott A. Imberman
9. See Autor and Duggan (2003) for a theoretical model of how job losses aﬀect DI appli-
cations.
Stapleton 1995; Stapleton et al. 1998; Black, Daniel, and Sanders 2002;
Autor and Duggan 2003).
Nonetheless, little previous work has estimated the contribution of busi-
ness cycle eﬀects to the recent substantial increase in the disability rolls.10
A simple examination of changes in DI application rates before and after
the two most recent recessions suggests that business cycle eﬀects could be
substantial. For example, from 1989 to 1993 the number of DI applications
per nonelderly adult increased by 37 percent, while from 1999 to 2003 this
increase was even greater at 49 percent. As figure 11.5 demonstrates, the
one exception to this occurred during the early 1980s recession, which co-
incided with a tightening of the medical eligibility criteria for the DI pro-
gram.
To probe this phenomenon more formally, we next explore the relation-
ship between business cycle conditions and DI application, award, and re-
cipiency rates for the 1984–2003 period by estimating specifications of the
following type:
Log(DI Applicationst)     UnempRatet  εt.
In this regression, the dependent variable is equal to the number of DI ap-
plications in the United States in year t divided by the number of individu-
als aged twenty-five to sixty-four, while the explanatory variable of interest
is equal to the unemployment rate for adults ages twenty-five and up.
According to the results summarized in the first column of table 11.5, the
business cycle has a significant eﬀect on applications to the DI program.
Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is as-
sociated with an eight percent increase in the DI application rate. Given
the average size of the labor force and of disability applications during our
study period, this suggests that for every one-hundred individuals newly
unemployed, there are approximately seven new DI applicants. As the sec-
ond column shows, the coeﬃcient estimate increases slightly if one instead
uses the previous period’s change in the unemployment rate as the ex-
planatory variable.
In the next two columns we explore this same relationship for the DI
award rate. If those who apply for DI because of deteriorating economic
conditions are healthier than the average DI applicant, then one would ex-
pect DI awards to be somewhat less responsive to the business cycle than
DI applications. Unfortunately, the DI award data are not linked to the
year of application but instead reflect the year in which the award was
made, and thus it is not possible to rigorously test this hypothesis. But
given that the estimates for the DI award rate are similar to the ones for the
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10. To our knowledge, the most recent study to estimate the contribution of economic con-
ditions to overall growth in DI recipiency was Stapleton et al. (1998), which only considers
data through 1992. Since that year, the DI rolls have grown by 75 percent.
DI application rate, it appears that the marginal applicants do not have
much lower acceptance probabilities than the average DI applicant and
thus may be in similarly poor health.
In the final two columns of this table we summarize the results for
changes in the DI recipiency rate. Unlike the previous two flow measures,
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Table 11.5 Annual time series regressions of Log DI on unemployment rate
1984–2003
 log applications  log awards  log recipients
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 unemp (t) 7.93∗∗∗ 8.11∗∗∗ 0.59
(1.83) (1.78) (0.74)
 unemp (t – 1) 9.04∗∗∗ 5.71∗∗ 1.50∗
(1.77) (2.05) (0.82)
Const 0.020 0.022 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
R-Squared 0.38 0.49 0.58 0.29 0.03 0.22
Obs 19 18 19 18 19 18
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Application, awards, and beneficiaries are per
1,000 persons twenty-five to sixty-four. Unemployment rate is for persons twenty-five and
older.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
Fig. 11.5 DI applications and unemployment rate
Sources: SSA Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary; US Census Bureau; Bureau of Labor Statistics.
this dependent variable is a stock, and thus one would expect a smaller re-
sponsiveness to the unemployment rate in percentage terms; an examina-
tion of the coeﬃcient estimates confirms this prediction. The coeﬃcient es-
timate of interest in the final column suggests that a 1 percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate in year t leads to a 1.5 percent increase
in DI enrollment in the next year.
Given this finding that the business cycle has a significant eﬀect on DI
entry, it is natural to ask how much lower the DI rolls would have been by
the end of 2003 if there had been no recession in 1991, or ten years later in
2001. To estimate this, we take the award rate in two years when economic
conditions were favorable, linearly interpolate between those two years to
estimate the award rate that would have occurred in the absence of business
cycle eﬀects, and calculate the diﬀerence between this estimate and the ac-
tual number of awards in that year. We then combine this with data from
the Social Security Administration on the fraction of DI awardees from
year t who were still receiving benefits at the end of 2003 to estimate what
fraction of these marginal awardees would have still been on the program
at the end of our study period.11 For our base year we choose 1984, a year
in which economic growth was strong and the unemployment rate was
falling, while for our second year we select 1999, the height of the 1990s ex-
pansion. We perform this simulation separately for both men and women
given the diﬀerent trends in DI award rates for the two groups during our
study period.
The results of our simulation are summarized in table 11.6. According to
this table, male award rates were more aﬀected by the 1991 recession than
by the one ten years later, while for women the eﬀects of the two recessions
were similar. But for both groups, it is this latter diﬀerence that contributes
more to the increase in DI enrollment from 1984 to 2003. This is because
many of those awarded benefits from 1991 to 1993 were no longer eligible
by the end of our study period. As the final rows of this table demonstrate,
the changes in the business cycle from 1984 to 2003 have contributed to the
growth in the DI rolls, though perhaps not as much as one would have 
expected. For men, economic conditions can explain 23 percent of the 
increase in the DI enrollment rate, while for women it can explain just 12
percent.
These estimates are subject to two possible sources of bias. First, many
of those who applied for DI in 1992 because of the recession may have ap-
plied a few years later in the absence of business cycle eﬀects. This type of
eﬀect would lead us to overstate the contribution of economic conditions
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11. The Social Security Administration publishes data on the fraction of people entitled to
receive DI in year t who are still receiving benefits in December of 2003, but publishes no sim-
ilar data for the year of award. The year of entitlement is typically earlier than the year of
award, and we therefore assume that individuals entitled in year t received their award in year
t  1 when estimating the fraction of DI awardees in year t still eligible in 2003.
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.
to the growth in the disability rolls from 1984 to 2003. Second, marginal
awardees may be healthier than the typical DI awardee and thus we may
understate the actual fraction still on the program by December of 2003
when we use the average for all individuals awarded benefits in a certain
year. Given that the eﬀects bias our results in opposite directions, as long
as neither eﬀect is too large our estimates should be reasonably accurate.
11.5 Program Changes
Two key determinants of an individual’s incentive to apply for DI bene-
fits are the financial generosity of the program and the probability that the
application will be successful. Since 1984, there have been important
changes in both of these, with these changes serving to increase individu-
als’ incentives to apply for DI benefits. In this section we aim to quantify
the contribution of both factors to the growth in the DI rolls during the
past two decades.
11.5.1 Changes in Replacement Rates
If an individual has suﬃcient work history to be insured by DI, his or her
potential benefits are a function of earnings in the current year and in most
previous working years. The formula used by the Social Security Adminis-
tration has been in eﬀect since 1978 and consists of two steps. First, the SSA
calculates an individual’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) in
year T as described in the following equation:
AIMEi  ∑
T
t1
Yit  max  , 1.
In this equation, Yjt represents individual j’s nominal monthly earnings in
year t that were subject to Old age, survivors, and disability insurance
(OASDI) taxes while Yt equals the average national wage in year t. As is
clear from the equation, nominal wages from a year before T – 2 are in-
flated using the ratio of average wages in the United States in year T – 2 to
average wages in year t. Earnings for the two most recent years are not in-
dexed and a person’s five lowest years of indexed earnings are dropped
from this calculation.12
The SSA then uses an individual’s AIME to calculate his or her Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA), which is equal to the monthly DI benefit in the
year that the award is made, as specified in the following equation:
YT	2


Yt
1


T
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12. There are two exceptions to this. First, if an individual has less than five years or just
slightly more than five years of earnings then fewer years are dropped from the calculation.
Second, if a person has more than forty years of indexed earnings then only the best thirty-
five are taken. Thus, for example, SSA would drop nine years of indexed earnings for a per-
son who worked in each year from ages eighteen to sixty-one before applying for DI benefits.
PIA 

with the bend points b1 and b2 rescaled each year by average wage growth
in the economy. This formula is progressive as low-income workers enjoy a
larger replacement rate than their high-income counterparts. This replace-
ment rate is the most commonly used measure of DI generosity and repre-
sents the ratio of DI benefits to recent earnings. In years after the initial
award, an individual’s PIA is scaled up by the growth in the Consumer
Price Index to account for increases in the cost of living.
As emphasized by Autor and Duggan (2003), since the formula was in-
troduced in the late 1970s, DI replacement rates have changed substantially
as a result of the increase in earnings inequality. These increases have been
important for two reasons. First, because the bend points are scaled up in
each year by average wage growth, low-skilled individuals are replacing 
an ever-greater fraction of their AIME at the 90 percent rate described in
the PIA formula. Second, because wages for low-skilled individuals have
tended to grow more slowly than the national average, indexed earnings in
previous years will be greater than earnings in more recent years.
But rising income inequality has not been the only factor influencing DI
replacement rates. An additional force that has tended to increase replace-
ment rates for high-income individuals is the substantial increase in the
amount of earnings subject to OASDI taxes. For example, in 1965 average
annual wages as calculated by the SSA were equal to $4,659, while social
security taxes were paid on just the first $4,800 in earnings. In contrast, by
1985 average wages were equal to $16,823, while an individual paid social
security taxes on his or her first $39,600 in wages. The growth in the tax
base that accelerated during the 1970s has led to a substantial increase in
the AIME for high-income workers.
In table 11.7 we shed some light on the importance of both of these fac-
tors while presenting simulated replacement rates in 1984 and in 2002 for
males in three diﬀerent age groups and at diﬀerent points in the earnings
distribution. We must simulate replacement rates because we do not have
full earnings histories for males in 1984 and in 2002. To simulate these re-
placement rates we follow the algorithm used by Autor and Duggan (2003)
in which the authors assume that an individual at a certain earnings per-
centile in his age group in year t is at this same percentile among his age
group in year t – 1.13 We consider indexed earnings for the years when the
if AIME ∈ [0, b1]
if AIME ∈ [b1, b2]
if AIME > b2
0.9  AIME
0.9  b1  0.32  (AIME 	 b1)
0.9  b1  0.32  (b2 	 b1)  0.15  (AIME 	 b2)
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13. More specifically, a fifty-nine-year-old male at the 25th percentile in the earnings dis-
tribution in 2002 is assumed to be a fifty-eight-year-old male at the 25th percentile in 2001, a
person is twenty-five through his or her current age and are therefore as-
suming that a person’s lowest earnings years occurred before the age of
twenty-five.
As is clear from the table, there were substantial increases in replacement
rates from 1984 to 2002.14 For example, among males between the ages of
fifty and sixty-one, replacement rates for 10th percentile workers increased
from 55.2 percent to 64.0 percent, while for the 25th percentile worker the
increase was similar from 46.4 percent to 55.3 percent. Much of the reason
for this increase is that a larger fraction of indexed earnings for both indi-
viduals were being replaced at the 90 percent rate in 2002 than in 1984.
Specifically, the bend points in the PIA formula were—in real terms—
scaled up by 19 percent during this eighteen-year period, while real wages
for these two groups increased by just 2 to 3 percent. Because these workers
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fifty-seven-year-old male at the 25th percentile in 2000, and so on. We use data from the 1964–
2003 March Current Population Survey for these calculations and consider only nonzero
wages in each year.
14. The increases are somewhat smaller than those documented in Autor and Duggan
(2003) because they consider 1979 to 1998, and there was a large increase in inequality from
1979 to 1984 (Katz and Autor 1999).
Table 11.7 Changes in replacement rates from 1984–2002
Replacement Monthly % earnings 
rate (%) real wage taxed
Percent 
1984 2002 1984 2002 change 1984 2003
Males 30–39
10th 48.4 59.4 1,619 1,371 –15 100 100
25th 41.3 49.2 2,476 2,125 –14 100 100
50th 36.2 41.9 3,536 3,250 –8 100 100
75th 29.4 34.7 4,803 4,917 2 98 100
90th 24.1 26.1 6,126 7,500 22 86 99
Males 40–49
10th 51.1 55.1 1,659 1,625 –2 100 100
25th 42.7 47.8 2,597 2,460 –5 100 100
50th 33.5 43.3 3,877 3,642 –6 96 100
75th 25.9 33.7 5,224 5,429 4 81 100
90th 19.4 24.8 7,012 8,250 18 64 93
Males 50–61
10th 55.2 64.0 1,522 1,573 3 100 100
25th 46.4 55.3 2,360 2,417 2 100 100
50th 34.7 45.9 3,607 3,667 2 87 100
75th 25.6 33.5 5,026 5,636 12 71 95
90th 19.0 23.7 6,782 8,333 23 55 79
Source: Authors’ calculations from March Annual Demographic Supplement of the CPS,
1964–2002.
had wages below the OASDI taxable maximum in each year, they paid so-
cial security taxes on 100 percent of their past earnings in both 1984 and in
2002. This point is summarized in the last two columns of the table.
But for the other three simulated work histories summarized in these col-
umns of the table, the growth in the OASDI tax base contributed to the in-
crease in the replacement rate from 1984 to 2002. For example, a near-
elderly male in 1984 who had remained at the 90th percentile in the
earnings history throughout his working years would have paid social se-
curity taxes on just 55 percent of his past earnings. His counterpart eight-
een years later paid OASDI taxes on a much larger fraction (79 percent) of
his earnings, and as a result the replacement rate for the 90th percentile
worker increased from 19.0 percent to 23.7 percent during our study pe-
riod. Interestingly, the largest increase in the replacement rate for near-
elderly males occurred for the median worker. This was true because this
worker both had very slow wage growth and experienced a mechanical in-
crease in his AIME because of the growing tax base.
The other two panels in this table summarize the change in simulated re-
placement rates for younger males. As one can see in the table, the increase
in earnings inequality is even more striking for men in their thirties and for-
ties during our study period than for near-elderly males. For example, real
wages for the 10th percentile male in his thirties fell by 15 percent from
1984 to 2002, while his counterpart at the 90th percentile enjoyed real earn-
ings growth of 22 percent.
Taken together, the replacement rate simulations summarized in table
11.7 strongly suggest that the financial incentive for a typical male worker
to apply for DI benefits increased substantially during our study period.
Averaging across the five simulated workers in each age group, our findings
suggest an increase from 36.2 percent to 44.5 percent for males ages fifty to
sixty-one, from 34.5 percent to 40.9 percent for males in their forties, and
from 35.9 percent to 42.3 percent for males in their thirties. Averaging
across these three age groups, our findings suggest a 20 percent increase
(from 35.5 percent to 42.6 percent) in the replacement rate for male work-
ers from 1984 to 2002.
How important have these changes been to the rise in the disability rolls?
To estimate this, one needs both the change in replacement rates and the
elasticity of DI recipiency to benefit generosity. We use estimates from
Bound et. al. (2004), who calculate an elasticity of 0.5.15 Thus, a 1 percent
increase in the DI replacement rate would lead to a 0.5 percent increase in
the long-run number of DI recipients. Combining this with the 20 percent
increase among males in the average DI replacement rate, this corresponds
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15. Their calculation is based oﬀ application elasticities from Halpern (1979) and Lando,
Coate, and Kraus (1979), information on historical award rates from Bound and Burkhauser
(1999), and data from matched Survey of Income and Program Participation/Social Security
Administration (SIPP-SSA) earnings data.
to an increase in the fraction of males receiving DI benefits of 0.26 per-
centage points from 1984 to 2002. Given that the baseline recipiency rate
was 2.64 percent, the growth in replacement rates can therefore explain 24
percent of the increase to 3.72 percent in the share of men receiving DI
benefits.
The algorithm used above to simulate replacement rates for men is less
likely to produce reliable estimates for women given the substantial
changes in female labor supply and in DI-insured status during our study
period. Additionally, women are more likely to drop out of the labor force
for a substantial amount of time than men, and thus the assumption that
an Nth percentile earner in year T is an Nth percentile earner in all previ-
ous years will more often be violated. To approximate the change in DI re-
placement rates from 1984 to 2002 among women, we take the admittedly
imperfect approach of scaling the increase of 20 percent in male replace-
ment rates by the ratio of female to male DI award value growth over this
same period. From 1984 to 2002, the inflation-adjusted DI award amount
for women increased by 26 percent, while the corresponding increase for
men was just 15 percent.
We therefore estimate that the average replacement rate for women in-
creased by 35 percent during our study period.16 Combining this with our
benefit elasticity from above, this suggests that the growth in replacement
rates among women can explain a 17.5 percent increase in the fraction of
insured women receiving DI benefits. Scaling this to account for the
changes in DI-insured status among women, this factor can explain a 0.50
percentage point increase in the fraction of women receiving DI benefits,
thus accounting for 28 percent of the actual increase of 1.81 percentage
points in DI receipt among women. This suggests that rising replacement
rates have been even more important for women than for men during the
last two decades.
11.5.2 Changes in Medical Eligibility Criteria
In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed legislation requiring the Social Secu-
rity Administration to use a broader definition of disability when deciding
whether to accept or reject a DI application. The legislation required SSA
to liberalize its screening of mental illness by placing more weight on func-
tional factors (e.g., ability to work) than on medical ones. Additionally, the
SSA had to give added weight to pain and related factors that were not pre-
viously considered in the disability determination. This latter change in-
fluenced certain diagnosis categories much more than others. Applicants
with common musculoskeletal conditions such as back pain and arthritis
would now have a greater probability of qualifying for DI benefits.
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16. This likely understates the true increase in replacement rates given that a much smaller
fraction would now be equal to zero as a result of the increase in DI-insured status.
Following these changes, the fraction of DI awardees with a mental dis-
order or a musculoskeletal condition as their primary diagnosis increased
substantially. From 1982 to 1983, just 28 percent of all DI awards went to
individuals in one of these two diagnosis categories, but twenty years later
that share had increased to 52 percent. These changes are summarized in
table 11.8, which lists the fraction of awards by diagnosis category just be-
fore the change in medical eligibility criteria and twenty years later. This
table also shows that a much smaller fraction of DI awardees now qualify
because of cancer (neoplasms) or because of circulatory conditions (e.g.,
heart disease, hypertension, stroke, etc.), the two most common diagnoses
in the early 1980s.
In the next column of the table, we summarize data on the average dura-
tion of DI receipt by diagnosis category using the results reported in Hen-
nessey and Dykacz (1989). In their study, the authors followed 18,816 DI
awardees from 1972 for seven to eight years to estimate the average length
of time that individuals spent on the program and how this varied across
conditions. The shift from conditions with low average durations such as
neoplasms to those with high average durations (e.g., mental disorders) has
no doubt contributed to the sharp fall in the exit rate from the DI program
that we see in figure 11.6. In every year between 1978 and 1984, the annual
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Table 11.8 Percent of awards by diagnosis category
Duration estimates of awardees
Percent Percent EstimatedAwards
dying remaining annual
1982– 2002– Mean within after exit 
1983 2003 durationa 4 yearsb 4 yearsb rate (%)c
Circulatory system 23.4% 11.7% 7.5 19.8 67.1 12.5
Neoplasms 17.0% 9.6% 3.5 81.0 14.6 47.3
Musculoskeletal system 14.9% 26.3% 10.0 5.3 81.6 6.6
Mental disorders 13.5% 25.7% 15.6 5.4 88.2 4.1
Nervous System and 
sense organs 8.7% 8.7% 12.5 10.6 80.3 7.1
Respiratory system 6.2% 4.3% 7.3 24.9 63.6 14.0
Injuries 5.3% 3.9% 9.9 6.7 72.0 10.4
Endocrine 4.6% 3.1% 8.3 18.4 73.4 9.8
Digestive system 1.9% 2.3% 7.0 36.9 56.3 17.4
Genitourinary system 1.6% 2.3% 7.5 30.3 60.2 15.6
Infectious and parasitic 1.5% 1.5% 7.6 11.6 79.0 7.6
All other 1.5% 0.7% 12.1 — — —
Total 610,021 1,486,089 9.2 21.9 67.9 12.1
aFrom Hennessey and Dykacz (1989). Based on awardees in 1972.
bFrom Hennessey and Dykacz (1993). Based on awardees in 1985.
cAuthors’ calculations based on Hennessey and Dykacz (1993). Based on awardees in 1985. 
exit rate from DI exceeded 14 percent, whereas this same exit rate in 2003
was just 7.9 percent.
Part of the reason for the diﬀerence in average durations across condi-
tions is the diﬀerence in mortality rates. In two subsequent studies, Hen-
nessey and Dykacz (1992, 1993) followed 34,762 DI awardees from 1985
for four years to determine the fraction that exited the program because of
death, retirement (and thus a shift to Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
[OASI]), or recovery. As the next column of the table shows, awardees with
a mental disorder or with a musculoskeletal condition had a significantly
lower probability of death during the subsequent four years than their
counterparts with other conditions. This shift from high- to low-mortality
diagnoses largely explains the 40 percent fall in the annual mortality rate
of DI recipients during the past twenty years.
In figure 11.7 we divide DI awards into three diﬀerent categories to sum-
marize trends in award rates during our study period. The first group con-
sists of awards with a primary diagnosis of cancer or a circulatory condi-
tion, while the second includes those with a mental disorder or a
musculoskeletal condition. The final group includes awards with any other
condition as the primary diagnosis. Each series in the figure represents the
number of awards per 1,000 individuals insured for DI benefits.
As the figure demonstrates, there has been little change over time in the
award rate for cancer and heart conditions. For example, in 1983 there were
1.15 awards in one of these two categories per 1,000 individuals insured by
DI versus 1.12 twenty years later. This contrasts sharply with the trend in
the award rate for mental disorders and musculoskeletal conditions, which
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Fig. 11.6 Fraction of DI recipients with benefits terminated: 1978–2003
Sources: Annual Statistical Supplement of the SSB; SSA Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary.
increased by more than a factor of three from 0.88 in 1983 to 2.67 twenty
years later. The increase in the award rate for all other conditions was much
smaller, though still substantial, from 0.93 to 1.47. However, awards for
these conditions started to fall in 1994 while musculoskeletal and mental
awards continued to rise.
Based on these trends and the description of the 1984 legislation above,
it is reasonable to conclude that DI awards for certain conditions were
much more aﬀected by the liberalized medical eligibility criteria than oth-
ers. For example, the changes presumably had little eﬀect on the probabil-
ity that an applicant with cancer or with a recent stroke would qualify for
benefits, while substantially raising this same probability for an applicant
with a mental disorder or musculoskeletal condition. This latter eﬀect
might have induced more individuals with these conditions to apply or to
appeal a rejection.17
Reliably estimating the contribution of the liberalized medical eligibility
criteria to the growth in the DI rolls is diﬃcult given that other factors were
also changing during this same period. As noted above, one would have ex-
pected an increase in DI award rates even without the less stringent criteria
given the change in the age structure, the recessions in 1991 and in 2001, and
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17. More than one-third of DI awards are made on appeal. Thus, while the initial allowance
rate is just 33 percent, the probability that an initial application will ultimately result in a suc-
cessful award is more than 50 percent.
Fig. 11.7 DI awards per 1,000 insured persons by diagnois categories
Sources: Annual Statistical Supplement of the SSB; Annual Statistical Report of the SSDI
Program; SSA Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary.
the increase in replacement rates. To control for the eﬀect of these other fac-
tors, we make the assumption that DI awards to individuals with mental dis-
orders and musculoskeletal conditions would have grown at the same rate
as for all other conditions from 1984 to the present if there were no changes
in the medical eligibility criteria. We exclude neoplasms and diseases of the
circulatory system from our control group given that there is little change in
the award rates for these two conditions over time (suggesting that these
conditions are unresponsive to the other factors studied above).
The key identifying assumption is that the responsiveness of DI awards
to replacement rates, economic conditions, and changes in the age struc-
ture is no diﬀerent for mental disorders and musculoskeletal conditions
than for other conditions such as diseases of the nervous or respiratory sys-
tem. To the extent that the changes in eligibility criteria aﬀected other di-
agnoses as well, we will tend to understate the eﬀect of the legislation. On
the other hand, it is plausible that individuals with one of these two condi-
tions are more responsive to economic conditions and rising replacement
rates, and thus one would have observed a greater increase even without
the new criteria. Recognizing these potential limitations, we estimate the
eﬀect of the change in criteria as summarized in the following equation:
CT  ∑
2003
t1985
(Amt 	 Smt)∗(1 	 r)
2003-t.
In this equation, Amt is equal to actual awards to individuals with a mental
disorder or musculoskeletal condition in year t, Smt is the simulated num-
ber of awards (assuming the same growth rate from 1984 to period t as for
the other conditions), and r is equal to our estimate of the annual exit rate
for these two diagnosis categories. We calculate this last parameter using
the annual exit rates implied by Hennessey and Dykacz (1993).18
The results of this calculation are summarized in appendix table 11A.1.
As the numbers summarized in the final row demonstrate, our estimates
suggest that there are an additional 498,887 men and 595,512 women on
the program in December of 2003 because of the more liberal screening cri-
teria. Dividing these by the gender-specific nonelderly adult population in
2003, this last factor can explain a 0.57 percentage point increase in the DI
recipiency rate among men and a 0.68 percentage point increase among
women, thus explaining 53 percent and 38 percent, respectively, of the
growth in DI receipt during the last two decades.
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18. Let Z be the fraction of people left on DI after four years and assume a constant exit
rate. Then the annual exit rate, R, is calculated as R  Z ^  (1/4). This would give us an exit rate
of 9.2 percent. In this case, however, such an exit rate is likely to be too low for long-term pro-
jections because they are based oﬀ of recent awardees, who tend to be younger then the aver-
age beneficiary. Thus, we adjust the exit rate to be R  Z ^ (1/3), which gives us a program-
wide exit rate of 12.1 percent, which is close to the oﬃcial beneficiary exit rate of 12.9 percent
in 1985.
11.6 Discussion
In the preceding three sections we have estimated the contribution of
changing population characteristics, economic conditions, and program
generosity to the growth in DI recipiency from 1984 to 2003. In doing this,
we have estimated the impact of each factor separately rather than all of
them simultaneously. We are therefore essentially assuming that the long-
run change in each factor is orthogonal to the change in all other factors.
This seems reasonable given that we have in many cases conditioned the
change in factor A holding constant factor B. For example, when estimat-
ing the eﬀect of rising replacement rates and more liberal eligibility crite-
ria we were careful to condition on the age structure. If we had not done
this an obvious concern would be that estimated contribution of each fac-
tor was to some extent driven by the shifting age structure and that we were
therefore double counting. An additional limitation with our method is
that it does not consider interaction eﬀects. For example, if more liberal el-
igibility criteria influence the eﬀect of rising replacement rates, we will miss
this by assuming a constant elasticity of DI receipt to the replacement rate.
Recognizing these two limitations, table 11.9 summarizes our findings
and reports results separately for men and women. Each entry in the table
represents our estimate of the contribution of a certain factor to the in-
crease from 1984 to 2003 in the proportion of men or women receiving DI
benefits.
As is clear from the table, the more liberal medical eligibility criteria rep-
resent the most important factor for both men and women. Their contri-
bution to the growth in DI receipt among men is larger in percentage terms
because there is less to explain for this group—recipiency rates for men
grew by 1.08 percent versus a 1.81 percent increase for women, while the
percentage point increases due to medical eligibility criteria were similar
for men and women. The change in DI-insured status is a much more im-
portant factor for women because of the substantial increases in female la-
bor supply during our study period. Growing replacement rates accounted
for approximately one-fourth of the growth in DI receipt for both groups
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Table 11.9 Determinants of DI growth for women and men (%)
Determinant of DI growth Women Men
Age structure 4 15
DI-insured status 24 3
Economic conditions 12 24
Replacement rates 28 24
Medical eligibility criteria 38 53
Total explained 106 119
whereas economic conditions were more important for men than for
women.
Summing up the contribution of each eﬀect, we can explain 119 percent
of the growth in DI receipt among men and 106 percent among women.
There are at least two reasons why we may slightly over-explain the growth
in DI receipt. First, our findings in 11.3.3 suggest that health has improved
among near-elderly men and women during the past two decades. It is
therefore likely that the growth in DI would have been even greater were it
not for this change. Second, we may to some extent double count when per-
forming our analyses. For example, if mental disorder DI awards were
more responsive than other awards to economic conditions, we would
count some of these excess awards twice in our calculations. Despite these
potential limitations, the fact that our analyses yield a number so close to
100 percent for both groups is striking.
In this chapter, we have not tackled the important question of whether
the increase in DI receipt has led to an increase or a reduction in social wel-
fare. As recent research has demonstrated (Bound et al. 2004), this ques-
tion is inherently diﬃcult because it depends on a reliable estimate for the
relative marginal utility of income when a person is disabled. More work
on this issue is clearly warranted.
11.7 Will the DI Rolls Continue to Grow?
From 1984 to 2004, the average annual growth rate in the number of
nonelderly adults receiving DI benefits was 4.44 percent, with this far out-
pacing population growth during this same period. For at least four rea-
sons, we expect the rise in the disability rolls to continue and perhaps ac-
celerate in the upcoming years.
11.7.1 Reaching the New Equilibrium
The equilibrium number of individuals on the DI program is equal to the
average number of awards in a year divided by the average exit rate from
the program. During our study period, the DI award rate has increased
while the exit rate from the program has fallen by an even larger amount.
Trends in the DI entry and exit rates are summarized in figures 11.6 and
11.8. As the first figure demonstrates, the fraction of individuals awarded
benefits was substantially greater during the 1990s than during the 1980s,
and the award rate reached its highest level ever in 2003. Even more strik-
ing has been the steady decline in the exit rate from the program, which fell
from 14.4 percent in 1984 to 7.9 percent by 2003.
The increasing award rate coupled with a declining exit rate explains the
rapid growth in DI recipiency during our study period. Given both of these
flows, the program is currently far from its equilibrium size. If the number
of DI awards remained at its 2003 level during the upcoming years while
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the termination rate stayed just below 8 percent, the number of individuals
receiving DI benefits would converge to 9.8 million. This represents an in-
crease of more than 62 percent from the current number of DI recipients.
For this reason, it is likely that the rise in the disability rolls will continue
and perhaps accelerate during the upcoming years.
11.7.2 Changes in the Age Structure
While DI award rates have increased substantially since the 1980s, the
aging of the Baby Boom population suggests that this award rate will grow
even more rapidly during the upcoming years. The potential importance of
this trend is illustrated in figure 11.9. As is clear from the figure, the num-
ber of near-elderly adults is projected to increase substantially in the pe-
riod from 2000 to 2020. For example, the number of individuals between
the ages of sixty and sixty-four—the ages with the highest rate of DI re-
ceipt—is projected to increase by more than 92 percent from 2000 to 2020.
Thus, absent other changes, the DI rolls will increase substantially as more
and more individuals enter their fifties and early sixties.
In table 11.10 we summarize the change in DI receipt that will occur
given the projected change in the age structure of the nonelderly adult pop-
ulation and assuming that award rates in each age group remain at their
2003 levels. Here we use the same algorithm as the one described in section
11.3.1 and find that changes in the age structure will lead to a 1.01 per-
centage point increase in DI receipt among men from 2003 to 2020 and a
0.74 percentage point increase among women. For men this is almost as
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Fig. 11.8 DI awards per 1,000 individuals ages 20–64
Sources: SSA Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary; U.S. Census Bureau.
large as the entire increase from 1984 to 2003, while for women it is almost
half as large as the change during this same period. Thus, the aging of the
Baby Boom population will lead to substantial increases in DI receipt dur-
ing the next fifteen years.
11.7.3 The Increase in the Normal Retirement Age
An individual born in 1937 or earlier and with suﬃcient work history to
qualify for OASDI benefits could receive retirement benefits equal to 80
percent of their PIA (Primary Insurance Amount) if they claimed benefits
at the age of sixty-two. For each additional month that these individuals
waited to claim benefits, they would receive an additional 5/9 percent of
their PIA until they could receive the full PIA at the age of sixty-five.
Among individuals born in 1937, more than 59 percent of individuals who
claimed retirement benefits did so at the age of sixty-two. An additional 19
percent claimed at the age of sixty-three or sixty-four. Thus, just 22 percent
of individuals waited until the age of sixty-five or later to claim retirement
benefits.
For cohorts born after 1937, the generosity of benefits at the early re-
tirement age of sixty-two will be lower. For example, a person born in 1943
will be able to receive only 75 percent of her PIA if she claims benefits on
her sixty-second birthday, while her counterpart born in 1960 or later will
receive just 70 percent at this same age. These reductions in benefit gen-
erosity at the age of sixty-two are a result of the increase in the normal re-
tirement age in the OASDI program, which is gradually increasing from
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Fig. 11.9 U.S. Population by age—estimates and projections
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
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sixty-five for cohorts born in or before 1937 to sixty-seven for individuals
born in 1960 or later.
No similar change is legislated for DI benefits. Thus during the upcom-
ing years, DI benefits will increase from being 25 percent more generous
than early retirement benefits to 33.3 percent more generous (for the 1943–
1954 cohorts) and eventually to 42.9 percent more generous. These
changes are likely to aﬀect DI receipt for at least two reasons. The first is a
mechanical one–DI beneficiaries will no longer be shifted to OASI retire-
ment benefits on their sixty-fifth birthday, but instead during the month
that they reach their cohort’s normal retirement age. Thus, there are cur-
rently some sixty-five-year-olds on DI and soon there will be sixty-six-
year-olds as well. The second one is behavioral—individuals may choose
to apply for DI given the reduction in the relative generosity of OASDI re-
tirement benefits. Estimating the magnitude of this and other behavioral
responses resulting from changes to the OASDI program represents an im-
portant area for future research.
11.7.4 The Rising Value of Medicare
During the last several years, health insurance premiums have increased
by 11 percent per year and the number of individuals without health in-
surance has increased by more than 10 percent. Both of these changes sug-
gest that the incentive to apply for DI will increase with the rising value of
health insurance through Medicare. Some recent research has explored the
contribution of health insurance coverage through Medicaid to the rise in
the SSI disability rolls and suggested that it can explain as much as 20 per-
cent of the growth in SSI receipt (Yelowitz 1998). Additional research on
this issue for the DI program is clearly warranted.19
Appendix
Data Sources
1. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. “Current Population
Survey: Annual Demographic File, 1964–2003 [Computer File]”. Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census [producer],
2002. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social
Research [distributor], 2003.
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19. In contrast to the SSI program, DI recipients must wait for two years from the onset of
disability before their Medicare coverage begins (Gruber and Kubik 2002). It is therefore
plausible that this program is less important for explaining the growth in DI than Medicaid is
for the growth in SSI. See Fronstin (2000) for a discussion of the possible eﬀects of Medicare
on the DI application decision.
2. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, National Center for
Health Statistics. Data File Documentations, Multiple Cause-of-Death,
1979–2001 (machine readable data file and documentation, CD-ROM
Series 20, various issues.), Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health
Statistics.
3. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, National Center for
Health Statistics. National Health Interview Survey, 1984–2002 [Com-
puter file]. Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and
Social Research [producer and distributor], 2003.
4. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Ad-
ministration, Oﬃce of Research and Statistics. Annual Statistical Bulletin
of the Social Security Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: 1980–2003. http://www
.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/index.html
5. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Ad-
ministration, Oﬃce of Research and Statistics. Annual Statistical Report on
the Social Security Disability Program. Washington, D.C.: 2000–2004.
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/index.html
6. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Ad-
ministration, Oﬃce of the Actuary. “Estimated Number of Workers Insured
in the Event of Disability, by Age Group and Sex, on December 31, 1970–
2004.” June 10, 2004. http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c2DI.html
7. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Administration, Oﬃce of the Actuary. “Disabled Worker Beneficiary
Statistics.” June 29, 2004. http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/dibStat.html
8. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Ad-
ministration, Oﬃce of the Actuary. “Social Security Administration Life
Tables.” Via the Berkeley Mortality Database. July, 1998. http://demog
.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality
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